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ABSTRACT
Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions 
on which we can perceive (at least some) mental states of others. In this paper we consider 
two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid 
model (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives 
and present some objections to both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating 
both accounts which allows us to avoid such objections. Broadly stated, our idea is that by 
perceiving other people’s behaviors we also perceive their mental states because behaviors 
co-present some features of the latter, and that this perception of others’ minds is direct 
and immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of the mental states in question.
Keywords: mindreading, hybrid model, direct perception of other minds, co-presence thesis.
RESUMO
Nos últimos tempos, vários filósofos têm defendido a ideia de que, por vezes, podem-se 
perceber (pelo menos alguns) estados mentais dos outros. Neste artigo, vamos considerar 
duas propostas neste sentido: a tese da copresença (Smith, 2010) e o modelo híbrido (Krue-
ger e Overgaard, 2012). Vamos examinar as alternativas mencionadas e apresentar algumas 
objeções contra eles. Então, vamos propor uma maneira de integrar ambas as explicações 
que nos permite evitar tais acusações. No geral, a nossa ideia é que, quando percebemos 
o comportamento dos outros nós também percebemos seus estados mentais, porque os 
estados mentais são coapresentados no comportamento, e que esta percepção das mentes 
dos outros é direta e imediata, porque o comportamento é parte integrante dos estados 
mentais em questão.
Palavras-chave: leitura mental, modelo híbrido, a percepção direta de outras mentes , tese 
de copresença.
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Laura Danón1, Daniel Kalpokas2
In ordinary life, we frequently talk about the mental lives of other people by using expres-
sions such as “He looked very angry”, “Don’t you see that she is in pain?”, “She sounded worried”, etc. 
How should we understand those expressions? If we interpret them literally, it seems that they 
make reference both to certain mental states that are attributed to people and to a particular way 
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of knowing about them: perception. But the mainstream tra-
dition in philosophy of mind has understood this in a differ-
ent way. In the debate about how we attribute mental states 
to others, the dominant positions usually only concede an 
indirect role to perception. It is generally accepted that per-
ception only gives us knowledge about bodies and behaviors 
from which, after an additional extra-perceptual inferential 
process, we reach the mental states possessed by the person in 
question. However, in the last few years, a growing number of 
philosophers have defended the idea that, as those everyday 
claims seem to suggest, on some occasions it is possible to per-
ceive the mental states of others (or at least some of them) in a 
direct way.3 The basic idea is that, in many of our encounters 
with other people, we have direct perceptual access to a ects 
of their mentality similar to the perceptual access to ordinary 
objects that we enjoy under normal conditions (Krueger and 
Overgaard, 2012; Krueger, 2012).4 In those cases, the contents 
of our perceptual states represent the mental states of other 
people; we literally see those mental states in their behavior.5 
This thesis, according to which we can have direct perceptual 
access to the mental states of others, is frequently called Direct 
Social Perception (hereafter DSP).6
Now, according to some philosophers, it is important to 
distinguish different ways of understanding DSP (Krueger, 
2012; McNeill, 2012; Herschbach, 2015; Michael and De 
Bruin, 2015; Bohl and Gangopadhyay, 2014): as a psycho-
logical, epistemological or phenomenological claim. In the 
first place, DSP can be an empirical, psychological claim about 
what sort of mechanisms enable us to attribute mental states 
to others (where it is frequently assumed that these mech-
anisms will be largely tacit or sub-personal).7 In this sense, 
DSP aims to provide an alternative to traditional theories of 
mindreading like Theory-Theory (hereafter TT) and Simu-
lation-Theory (hereafter ST). While for the latter we only at-
tribute mental states to others after non-perceptual processes 
involving theoretical knowledge or simulations, the former 
claims that it is possible to attribute mental states by using 
exclusively perceptual mechanisms.
Secondly, DSP could be mainly concerned with episte-
mological issues about how we can come to know the mental 
states of others, whether we can have perceptual and non-in-
ferential knowledge of them, and what kind of evidence or 
justification (perceptual, inferential, etc.) we need to have in 
order to warrant those attributions.8 Under this reading, DSP 
opposes “inferentialism” (McNeill, 2012; Spaulding, 2015). 
According to inferentialists, all our knowledge about the 
mental states of others is inferential. We can have direct per-
ceptual knowledge about the behaviors and gestures of other 
people, but we cannot have direct perceptual knowledge of 
their mental lives. Our knowledge about the mental states 
of others must be inferentially derived from our perception 
of their observable behavior and other non-mental features. 
DSP defenders, on the contrary, argue that when perceiving 
the behaviors of others we can directly perceive their mental 
states and, at the same time, obtain genuine non-inferential 
knowledge about them.  
Finally, DSP could be understood as a phenomenological 
thesis regarding how other minds are consciously perceived. 
Those who defend DSP as a phenomenological claim reject 
a widely accepted assumption: that the minds of others are 
unobservable and that, as a consequence, all we can directly 
experience are their behaviors. Mentality must be somehow 
3 In the analytic tradition, some early advocates of this possibility are Wittgenstein (2009), McDowell (1998), and Dretske (1973). With 
some differences between them, recent defenders of this approach are Cassam (2007), Krueger and Overgaard (2012), Krueger (2012, 
2013a, 2013b), Smith (2010), McGeer (2009), Gallagher (2008), Zahavi (2011), Stout (2010), and McNeill (2010).
4 In the context of the epistemology of perception and philosophy of mind, the expressions “direct perception” and “immediate per-
ception” are considered equivalent, and “direct” and “immediate” are mainly understood in the sense of “non-inferential”. See, for in-
stance, McDermid (2001), Malcom (1953), and Snowdon (1992). In particular, Snowdon (1992) elucidates the notion of direct perception 
as follows: a subject S directly perceives an object O if and only if S stands, in virtue of her perceptual experience, in such a relation to 
O that, if S could make demonstrative judgments, then it would be possible for S to make the true demonstrative judgment “That is O”.
5 In this paper we will focus on the visual perception of mental states. However, we also consider it plausible to think that sometimes we 
can hear, feel, etc. the mental states of others. It would be possible, for example, that while talking to someone on the phone one could 
hear her sadness or feel someone’s nervousness in her handshake.
6 DSP advocates usually focus on intentions and perceptions as the kinds of mental states that can be directly perceived. It is more 
controversial whether DSP can be also extended to account for the attribution of other types of mental states with more indirect and 
tenuous links with behavior.
7 See Herschbach (2008) and Lavelle (2012) for a defense of a sub-personal reading of the Simulation Theory (ST) and the Theory-Theory (TT). 
8 Sometimes philosophers disagree on whether DSP should be interpreted as an answer to the empirical question or to the epistemo-
logical one. For example, whereas McNeill (2012) focuses on DSP understood as an epistemological hypothesis, Krueger (2012) seems 
to be mainly interested in dealing with DSP as an answer to the empirical question (although Krueger, 2013a, also suggests that, once 
we endorse DSP and deny the unobservability of mental states, the epistemological problem of other minds dissipates). Thus, Krueger 
holds that the rivals of DSP are, in fact, the Theory-Theory and the Simulation Theory. Smith’s position on the subject is more complex. 
On the one hand, he acknowledges that the epistemological side of the debate is the main concern in his paper. On the other hand, he 
presents DSP as an alternative to TT and ST, and he argues that, even though they are both usually proposed as descriptive/empirical 
theories, they can also be stated as answers to the epistemological debate on the inferential/non-inferential status of our knowledge of 
other minds. His main idea here is that, insofar as the input into the tacit theory/simulation process is the content of a perceptual state, 
TT and ST defenders will assume that such content does not yet ascribe mental predicates to others (Smith, 2010, footnote 4). Thus, 
according to them, some additional cognitive process must be added to perception in order to have knowledge of the minds of others.
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inferred from directly experienced public data. DSP advo-
cates point out, instead, that we can have a direct experiential 
access to the minds of others; i.e., we can perceive their men-
tal states in their gestures and behaviors (Bohl and Gango-
padhyay, 2014). 
These three ways of understanding DSP somehow re-
ject that perceiving others’ mental states involves inferential 
processes. But, as we shall see, the notion of inference changes 
in each of these debates. As mentioned above, when DSP is 
taken as a psychological claim, it opposes TT and ST. Now, 
according to the interpretation usually given by DSP advo-
cates, TT defenders claim that the inferences in question 
involve a body of theoretical knowledge about the causal/ra-
tional relations between mental states, environmental stimuli 
and behavior. ST advocates, instead, posit a process of sim-
ulation of the likely mental states of the others and a subse-
quent inference that allows the attribution of those simulated 
mental states to them (Herschbach, 2015)9. In any case, these 
inferential processes are generally considered to be sub-per-
sonal and tacit. They are not open to intro ection, or con-
scious deliberation, nor do they have any phenomenologically 
distinctive chara er. 
In the epistemic debates which revolve around how we 
can have knowledge of the mental states of others, the so called 
“inferentialists” consider that, in order to show how a subject 
S could count as knowing that another person C is in mental 
state M, we need to posit an inference which allows the der-
ivation of S’s knowledge regarding C’s mental states from a 
set of basic propositional perceptual states of S —states about 
C’s behavior, gestures and so on— and some generalizations 
which connect the latter with the former (McNeill, 2012).10 
Hence, for the inferentialist, S’s knowledge or awareness of 
C’s mental states must always be inferentially derived from 
a more basic awareness of C’s non-mental features. On the 
contrary, DSP defenders contend that we can sometimes have 
perceptual knowledge of the mental states of others, which is 
both epistemically basic and non-inferential.
Finally, when DSP is posited as a phenomenological or 
experiential claim, it opposes the idea that our experience of 
the mental states of others is always the experience of forming 
a belief about them via an inferential process from the con-
scious perception of their gestures and behavior (Herschbach, 
2015). Thus, it rejects the idea that there is an actual infer-
ential process, of which we are somehow aware, mediating 
between our perceptual states about the gestures and behav-
iors of others and our beliefs about their mental states. DSP 
defenders claim, instead, that, at least on some occasions, we 
directly experience the sadness or the anger in someone’s face 
or in her behavior, instead of acquiring knowledge or beliefs 
about the sadness secondarily and as a result of perceiving 
such behavior.
These clarifications are important because, in recent 
times, many philosophers, neuroscientists, and psychologists 
have chara erized perception itself as an inferential process 
(Hershbach, 2015; Michael and De Bruin, 2015). If this is so, 
all we can claim, at best, is that there is an indirect and infer-
entially mediated perception of the mental states of others, 
but never a direct one.11 Now, those who think that percep-
tion is inferential usually endorse a deflated, sub-personal, 
implicit and non-propositional notion of inference. That is 
why it seems to us that such a claim is only relevant, at best, 
for those intere ed in defending DSP as an empirical psycho-
logical claim. 
Now, in this paper, we will focus on DSP as a person-
al-level hypothesis about both the epistemology and the phe-
nomenology of perception, and we think that the claim that 
perception is inferential loses its relevance once we under-
stand DSP in this sense. The reason is straightforward. In the 
epistemological debate, the kind of inferential process posed 
by the epistemic inferentialist, and rejected by DSP advocates, 
is one composed of propositionally structured premises (in-
stead of being a non-propositional process). In turn, advocates 
of DSP as a phenomenological thesis reject that our access to 
the mental states of others is always experienced as indirect 
and inferentially mediated. Hence, they reject conscious, per-
sonal-level inferences as an ineludible component of our ex-
perience of other minds, not tacit sub-personal ones.
Now, when we try to clarify what DSP could consist of, 
the alternatives proliferate. In what follows, we will examine 
and evaluate two proposals: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 
2010) and the constitution thesis —or the hybrid model— 
(Krueger and Overgaard, 2012; Krueger, 2012). More  ecif-
ically, we would like to examine the merits and limits of these 
two models, if we think of them as ways of fleshing out the 
epistemic and phenomenological versions of DSP. We do not 
aim to argue in favor of DSP against its inferentialist rivals. 
Instead, we would like to explore which would be the best 
theoretical alternative for those intere ed in adopting this 
approach. In the first section of the article, we present the 
co-presence thesis and an objection against it. In the second 
section, we briefly reconstruct the hybrid model of Krueger 
and Overgaard and, in turn, raise some challenges to it. In the 
third section, we present an alternative proposal that over-
comes the criticisms presented against the two previous mod-
els and we show how the co-presence thesis and the constitu-
tion thesis can be successfully integrated. This third proposal 
intends to incorporate the best elements of the two others, 
providing us with a more adequate and stronger explanatory 
9 Herschbach (2008) provides reasons against such a reading of TT and ST.
10 According to McNeill (2012), what the inferentialist claims is only that such an inference must be posited if we want to explain how 
a subject can count as having knowledge of the mental states of others, regardless of whether the subject in question does engage in 
any actual inferential process.
11 The idea that we have an inferential perceptual access to the mental states of others is defended, for example, by Green (2010).
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model of what perceptual knowledge of the mental states of 
others could consist in. 
The Co-presence Thesis
In his paper “Seeing Other People” (2010), Smith tries to 
shed light on the thesis that —at least on some occasions— it 
is possible to perceive other people’s mental states. Smith does 
not deny that, sometimes, our knowledge of other minds is 
inferential or indirect. Nevertheless, he believes that this 
is not always so and, therefore, wants to clarify and defend 
what he calls “The Perceptual View”. To do so, he combines a 
functionalist account of mental properties with a Husserlian 
thesis about perception.
Taking into account a well-known idea from Husserl, 
Smith points out that there is more to our visual experience 
than meets the eye. For example, when we visually perceive 
a solid object, like a cup, only a part of it faces us (i.e., only 
a part of it reflects light onto the retina to form the retinal 
image). Regardless of this, we experience the whole cup as a 
complete object with a front and a backside, and not mere-
ly as a bi-dimensional picture. Generalizing, physical objects 
are presented to us from a particular per ective, in virtue of 
certain modes of appearance that depend on our location in 
space with re ect to them. Thus, in every perceptual experi-
ence of an object there is a core constituted by the a ects of 
it directly presented to sight. Yet, in each perceptual experi-
ence, this presented a ect is accompanied by other features 
of the object, which are not actually seen. These other a ects 
are co-presented when perceiving the object (they constitute, 
in Husserl’s terms, “the internal horizon” of the perceived 
object). Thus, when we see a book, only one a ect of it is 
presented to us: its front. Even though they are not present-
ed, its rear a ect and its innards are —according to Smith— 
co-presented. When we perceive an object, its co-presented 
a ects are those that we anticipate would be presented to us 
if, for instance, we changed our location with re ect to the 
object that we see. In fact, such anticipations have an “if… 
then…” structure because they refer to the features we would 
see if we moved or intera ed with the perceived objects in 
certain ways. These anticipations are genuinely perceptual, 
rather than being mere beliefs about possible experiences. 
Nevertheless, Smith acknowledges that they lack the “intu-
itional fullness” of the fully presented a ects.  
Basically, Smith’s strategy consists of extending this no-
tion of perception of physical objects to the perception of oth-
er people’s mental states:
Just as the rear aspect of the book is visu-
ally present without being visually present-
ed, so another’s misery is visually present 
even though only their frown is visually 
presented. This view would count as a per-
ceptual account of our access to others’ 
mental states, but would also respect the 
deep-seated intuition that others’ mental 
states are in some sense hidden from view 
(Smith, 2010, p. 739).
Briefly, the idea is that while behavior is presented in vi-
sual experience, mental states —strictly  eaking— are only 
co-presented.12 Now, Smith adopts a functionalist conception 
of mental properties, according to which properties such as 
being angry or being in pain are functionally individuated in 
terms of the behaviors that their owners tend to carry out 
under certain circumstances. Thus, if S has a mental prop-
erty M, this means that S has a pattern of dispositions to 
behave in  ecific ways when S is in circumstances C or in 
the presence of certain stimuli I. Moreover, there is a set of 
conditional sentences of the form “S will behave in a certain 
way B in the presence of stimuli I” which describes such be-
havioral dispositions adequately. But then, let us suppose that 
by perceiving S’s behavior we are able to precisely anticipate 
that S has those dispositions that individuate M (the mental 
property expressed by S’s behavior). In such a case, we would 
be accurately grasping the functional role (or the dispositional 
profile) of M. And this would be —according to Smith— a 
way of perceiving that S possesses the mental state M. In this 
way, Smith arrives at what he calls ‘principle L’.
(L) For any object O and functional property 
F, if the perceptual anticipations in one’s per-
ception of  O ‘latch onto’ the functional role 
definitive of F, then one perceives O as being 
F (Smith, 2010, p. 741).
According to Smith, (L) explains how the functional 
properties enter into the content of our perceptual experi-
ence. The “if… then…” structure, which reflects the perceptu-
al anticipations we form when perceiving something, shows 
how perception can put us in contact with the functional 
properties chara eristic of mental states.  
Notwithstanding these virtues, the co-presence thesis 
has been objected by Krueger and Overgaard (2012) and 
Krueger (2012, 2013a). According to these authors, one 
problem with Smith’s proposal is that the perception of oth-
ers’ mental states cannot be equated to the perception of a 
tridimensional object such as a tomato or a table because, in 
the latter case, we can move our head, our body, etc., until 
the occluded parts of the object become visually presented 
to us and not merely co-presented. However, nothing sim-
ilar happens in the case of perceiving the mental states of 
others. Moving ourselves around, peering more closely or 
moving the body of the other person, will never bring their 
mental states into direct view. As Smith himself acknowl-
12 Bohl and Gandgopadhyay (2013) and Gangopadhyay and Miyahara (2014) also suggest turning to Husserl’s ideas in order to develop 
a better account of what perceiving another mind might consist in.
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edges, these can only be co-presented with the perceived 
behavior. Thus, they can never acquire the “intuitional full-
ness” of the fully presented.   
Smith’s answer to this objection is that our anticipa-
tions of co-presented mental states can be confirmed, not by 
means of subsequent presentations of those mental states as 
such, but rather by means of new behavioral presentations. 
What one anticipates, in the case of a co-presented mental 
state, are subsequent presentations of behaviors that, in turn, 
would co-present, if they actually took place, other mental 
states related to the first one. Thus, if your frown co-presents 
irritation, we can anticipate subsequent behaviors —such as 
cries— which would co-present related mental states, like an-
ger. As Smith claims: “We can regard one’s co-presentations of 
another’s mentality to be fulfilled not, as with the rear a ect 
of the book, by the co-presented becoming presented, but by 
the co-presented and presented taking part in a harmonious 
experience” (Smith, 2010, p. 741).
A problem with this answer —Krueger and Overgaard 
argue— is that it leads us to conclude that the mental states of 
others “really are out of reach of our perceptual experiences. 
All we ever really see —have presented to us— is behavior. The 
mental, though somehow co-presented, is never really given as 
such” (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012, p. 245). Expressing it dif-
ferently: mental phenomena remain unobservable in exactly 
the same way as the backside of the tomato (Krueger, 2012). 
In consequence, according to these authors, the Husserlian 
thesis of perceptual co-presence does not adequately explain 
the possibility of perceiving the mental states of others.  
The hybrid model and 
the constitutive relation: 
An objection 
After criticizing the co-presence thesis, Krueger and 
Overgaard delineate an alternative way of understanding 
DSP. Concisely, their proposal rests on a hybrid model, ac-
cording to which some expressive behaviors are constitutive 
parts of mental phenomena. 
Those who defend DSP typically claim that the minds of 
others are, at least on some occasions, perceptually accessible 
to us in their expressive behaviors. Nevertheless, Krueger and 
Overgaard point out that this way of putting things remains 
ambiguous at a crucial point that needs further clarification. 
Basically, the problem is that it is possible to understand “ex-
pression”, as the term is used when it is claimed that behavior 
expresses mental states, in at least three different ways.    
 A first alternative is to think that behavior expresses our 
inner mental states in the sense that the former is caused by 
the latter. But, as the authors argue, if we opt for understand-
ing “expression” in this sense, we do not abandon the old Car-
tesian idea that mental states are essentially private, inner and 
experientially inaccessible to anyone but their owner. After 
all, for such a view, we can only directly perceive the behav-
ioral effects of the mental states of others, but we can never 
perceive those mental states themselves. It is clear that such 
notion of “expression”, which equates mental states to unob-
servable entities that can only be inferentially known, is not 
the one that defenders of DSP are in need of.   
A second alternative is provided by the thesis of 
co-presence that we examined in the first section. In this 
case, claiming that certain behavior expresses certain men-
tal states amounts to affirming that when we perceive the 
expressive behavior of another subject, associated mental 
phenomena are experientially co-presented. Nonetheless, 
as we have already mentioned, Krueger and Overgaard 
reject this second option because they believe that, since 
mental phenomena can only be co-presented but nev-
er directly presented to us in our perceptual experience, 
they end up being “phenomenally degraded” (Krueger and 
Overgaard, 2012, p. 244). 
Finally, the authors hold that there is a more promis-
ing option, which consists of understanding “expression” in 
a constitutive sense. According to this third alternative, the 
behaviors of others express their mental states because they 
are proper parts or proper components of them. Mental states 
have a hybrid structure, composed of both internal process-
es (neural, psychological and/or phenomenal) and external, 
spatially located, and publically perceivable processes (bodi-
ly behaviors and gestures). The main idea here is that (at 
least some) mental states are complex wholes made up of 
different heterogeneous components with complementary 
functions. All these elements must come together and co-
ordinate their re ective functions harmoniously for the 
subject to have —or to experience— the mental state in 
question (at least in a full-blown sense) (Krueger, 2013a).13 
13 Does this mean that those behaviors which are proper parts of mental state M are also necessary to instantiate M? The problem with 
such a strong claim is that, on many occasions, we attribute mental states to others even if they do not express them publicly. However, 
we think there is a better and more modest way of understanding the constitutive link between mental states and behavior (see also 
Newen et al., 2015, for a similar proposal). According to it, it is possible to have an instance of mental state M even when one does not 
actually manifest any of the behaviors that are proper components of M and, conversely, it is also possible to perform those behaviors 
without having M. Nevertheless, there is a natural correlation between both of them, which allows us to say that paradigmatic or typical 
instances of M do involve those behaviors. The analogy with ordinary physical objects is clear. Imagine a book lacking its cover. That 
would not stop us from considering that this particular object is an instance of a book. Nevertheless, typical or paradigmatic instances 
of books have covers, and covers are indeed proper parts of books. Moreover, there seems to be a normative element involved here as 
well. Hence, when we see a coverless book, we feel justified in judging that something is missing in it. Likewise, imagine that someone 
who is supposed to be very sad does not show any of the usual manifestations of sadness. One may feel that something is missing here 
and, even more, one may look for excusing conditions that explain why those behaviors are absent.
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Since some of these constitutive elements are public and 
observable patterns of behavior, gestures and bodily ac-
tions, it is legitimate to conclude that, according to this 
view, our minds extend beyond our brains and reach out 
to the surface of our bodies and its behavioral responses 
(McNeill, 2012). 
Krueger and Overgaard support this thesis by offer-
ing some empirical evidence in favor of the complementar-
ity between the private and public components of mental 
states (see also Krueger, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). For example, 
people with Moebius Syndrome are incapable of facially 
expressing emotions, and this incapability seems to cause 
a decrease in the intensity of those emotions. Something 
similar is reported by patients who have received Botox 
injections, which inhibit the facial expression of emotions. 
These and other results suggest that neural and physio-
logical processes must coordinate their functions with the 
relevant expressive-behavioral processes for the subject to 
be able to instantiate (full-blown) emotional experiences. 
According to Krueger and Overgaard, something similar 
is true in the case of intentions and thoughts.14 Thus, in all 
these cases, when we perceive certain expressive gestures 
and behaviors in the body of others, we literally perceive 
parts of their mental states.15
This third option, they argue, is the best one for those 
who wish to defend DSP, since it does not treat the mental 
states of others as Cartesian entities and does not imply ei-
ther—as the co-presence thesis seems to do— that there is 
a phenomenological difference between the way in which 
we perceive behavior and the way in which we perceive 
mental states.  
It is important to highlight the explicit anti-reduction-
ism of the hybrid model defended by Krueger and Overgaard. 
As the authors themselves point out, if one wants to defend 
a constitutive link between behavior and mentality, one has 
two options:
(i)  To claim that mental states are identical to, and noth-
ing more than, the expressive behaviors that consti-
tute them. This clearly implies a reduction of mental 
states to expressive behaviors. 
(ii)  To acknowledge that mental states are not equal to 
those behaviors with which they are, nevertheless, 
constitutively related. Gestures and behaviors are 
parts of mental states, but mental states also have 
other non-behavioral components (phenomenolog-
ical, neurological, etc.).
Krueger and Overgaard clearly endorse (ii) and, conse-
quently, they can easily avoid the risk of reductionist behav-
iorism. According to them, some mental states are hybrid 
in the sense that they are composed of inner and outer pro-
cesses. The behavioral component of mental states remains 
distinct from, for example, the related neural a ivity or the 
phenomenological a ects of an emotional experience. Par-
ticular cases of cognition and emotion are instantiated by the 
complementary coordination of neural, physiological, and 
behavioral components.   
At the same time, positing a constitutive link in this weak 
sense gives some initial plausibility to the claim that we can di-
rectly perceive (at least some of) the mental states of others. 
In order to see this point, let us focus on cases of ordinary per-
ception of physical objects. In everyday life, we say, for example, 
that we see an iceberg even when only its tip emerges from the 
water. In such a case, we see an iceberg by seeing a proper part of 
it. Likewise, we say that we perceive a house even when, strictly 
 eaking, we only see its front, etc. Analogously, Krueger and 
Overgaard argue, when we see certain expressive behaviors of 
other people, what we perceive, directly and without interme-
diaries, are the mental states of which they are proper parts.
Now, despite these virtues, the hybrid model faces its 
own problems. According to it, a subject can perceive the 
mental states of others directly, even though only parts of 
them —some of their expressive gestures and behaviors— 
are visually accessible to her. Now, imagine that a subject 
S is in front of another person C, and S perceives certain 
gestures and behaviors of C that, in fact, are proper parts of 
a mental state M. Then two possibilities arise:
 (a)  On some occasions, S will perceive C’s mental state 
M in C’s gestures and behavior. For example, when S 
is in front of C and C is frowning, she will   perceive 
that C is angry (S will see C’s anger in C’s behavior) 
and thereby she will obtain knowledge (or at least 
beliefs) about C’s anger as such.
(b)  On other occasions, instead, S will perceive C’s be-
havior and gestures and, despite those behaviors and 
gestures actually being part of C’s mental state M, 
S will fail to perceive M in those behaviors. Thus, S 
will neither have a conscious experience of M nor 
acquire perceptually based knowledge or beliefs 
about M as M. To give just one example, when S sees 
C frowning, she will be actually facing C’s anger, but 
all S will perceptually experience is the frown. S will 
not see that C is angry.
14 The authors also present some evidence to support the claim that intentions are often embodied in expressive actions, something that 
makes them available to direct perception. For example, by the age of 7-9 months, infants seem to perceive certain ambiguous actions 
(like offering and withdrawing objects) as playful intention. Studies with human adults show, similarly, that viewers watching point-light 
displays of staged social actions were able to discern whether the activity was intended and not simply a chance encounter (see also 
Krueger, 2013a). Likewise, they quote several studies which support the suggestion that gestures may be part of cognitive processes 
like thinking and memorizing.
15 The term “part” is used broadly and rather loosely in this context to include not merely particular physical objects and states, but also 
particular events and processes. See McNeill (2012). 
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In other words, as seen above, even if some charac-
teristic gestures and behaviors are proper parts of certain 
mental states, they are not identical to them. But then, even 
if people can sometimes perceive the latter in the former, 
they may not always do so. This seems to be what happens, 
for example, when a person unfamiliar with a specific con-
text, or lacking enough experience, is only capable of seeing 
the movements of another person, describing them, etc., 
but is incapable of identifying which is the mental state 
that they express. A boy who sees an unknown girl smil-
ing at him and tries to decipher the meaning of that ges-
ture may be exactly in this situation. “Why is she smiling? 
Is she happy? Is she mocking me? Is she amused?” he may 
wonder. In such a case, despite clearly seeing that the girl is 
smiling, the boy fails to perceive the mental state that the 
smile expresses. 
Something similar happens in some cases of percep-
tion of physical objects. To see this, let us return to the 
example of the subject S who perceives an iceberg by seeing 
its tip. In such a case, S only has direct visual access to the 
tip of the iceberg, but she does perceive the iceberg as an 
iceberg. Now, it seems that her accomplishment of such 
a feat involves some knowledge of the mass of ice under 
water or, at least, that it involves some expectations about 
its existence. Presumably, this is what allows S to perceive 
the tip of the iceberg as an iceberg. But her twin, S*, who 
lacks such knowledge/expectations, will be able to see the 
tip of the iceberg, but she will not perceive it as (a part of ) 
an iceberg. S* will be deprived, then, of the possibility of 
perceiving the whole object. 
Now, it is not clear how Krueger and Overgaard’s pro-
posal could allow us to differentiate the kind of situation 
described in (a) where S perceives C’s mental state in her 
overt behavior from (b) where S perceives C’s behavior as 
mere behavior. In both situations we have a subject who per-
ceives a proper part —some behavior— of a larger totality: 
the mental state. But why does it happen that sometimes 
the perceiver can have (some) epistemic perceptual access 
to the totality while, on other occasions, all she perceives is 
the proper part? Besides, how can we explain the difference 
between these two cases? Since Krueger and Overgaard are 
intere ed in elaborating DSP as a claim about the possibility 
of having perceptual experience and perceptual knowledge 
of the mental states of others, they need to elaborate an an-
swer to these questions, but their account does not provide 
us with the necessary elements to do so.
In summary, Krueger and Overgaard owe us an explana-
tion of how a subject who has visual access to some expressive 
behavior can have also a perceptual access to the mental state 
of which such behavior is a proper part. And, at this point, 
saying that some expressive behaviors are constitutive parts 
of mental states does not help at all, because a constitutive 
relation —as they chara erize it— is just an ontological link 
that relates behaviors to mental states independently of any 
knowledge we may have of the aforementioned relata. 
Co-presence, constitution and 
partial knowledge of other minds
In this section, we will try to show that Smith’s pro-
posal is a valuable tool if we want an account of DSP which 
allows us to distinguish perception of another person’s 
mental states from perception of her current behavior. 
However, we still need to give an appropriate answer to 
Krueger and Overgaard’s objection against the co-presence 
claim presented above, in the section devoted to present-
ing Smith’s proposal. We will therefore argue, in what fol-
lows, that it is also possible to provide such an answer if 
one is willing to combine the co-presence thesis with the 
hybrid model defended by its critics. Thus, by articulating 
the co-presence thesis and the claim that there is a consti-
tutive link between mental states and behaviors, we will 
both give a response to Krueger and Overgaard’s objection 
against the former and provide an adequate explanation of 
what is required in order to perceive the mental states of 
others as such in their behaviors. 
First, let us go back to Krueger and Overgaard’s ob-
jection. The defender of co-presence argues that perceiving 
the mental states of others in their behavior is analogous to 
perceiving a tomato by seeing its front. In both cases, there is 
something that is visually presented to us (the behavior/the 
front side of the fruit) and hidden a ects that are merely an-
ticipated or co-presented (the mental phenomena expressed 
in their behavior/the backside and the innards of the fruit). 
The problem is that the analogy fails at a crucial point. When 
we perceive three-dimensional opaque objects, we can move 
our bodies in different ways until what was merely co-pre-
sented becomes presented. The mentality of others, in con-
trast, can never be brought into a direct view in the same way. 
Of course, we can, as Smith claims, “confirm” that we have ad-
equately perceived another person’s mental state in her har-
monious subsequent behavior. However, a central difference 
remains: while in the case of perceiving a tomato we can even-
tually come to see its backside directly, when we are facing an 
angry person, all we ever really see are simply different behav-
ioral manife ations of her anger in different circumstances.
Thus, as Krueger and Overgaard argue, since all we ever 
directly see —all that is ever presented to us— are others’ 
behavioral manife ations, we can doubt “whether CP [the 
co-presence thesis] makes any advance beyond more tradi-
tional accounts, according to which the mental states of oth-
ers are ‘unobservable’ and thus must be inferred” (Krueger 
and Overgaard, 2012, p. 245). 
How should we address this objection? A plausible reac-
tion would be to reject Krueger and Overgaard’s objection on 
the basis that it is unjustly oblivious to the fact that, according 
to Smith’s account, co-presented a ects do constitute part 
of the content of perceptual experience. Thus, in what sense 
would it be fair to go on claiming that those mental states re-
main unobservable? 
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Now, although this initial reply has some bite, we think 
that Krueger and Overgaard may still have a valid point. To 
see why this is so, imagine that we asked defenders of the 
co-presence model whether they think that those behaviors 
that are expressive of mental states are also proper parts 
of them or not. If these philosophers deny that expressive 
behaviors are proper parts of mental states, then they are 
committed to treating the latter and the former as “different 
existents”.  Now, according to Smith’s model, our visual ex-
perience of others seems to be exhaustively composed of: (i) 
their presented actual behaviors; and (ii) the co-presented 
potential behaviors that are not being actually manife ed 
but that, we anticipate, could be manife ed under appro-
priate circumstances. Then, all we can experience perceptu-
ally —all that is ever presented or co-presented to us— are 
(actual or potential) gestures and behaviors. But if this is so, 
under the assumption that mental states might be some-
thing different from gestures and behaviors, it seems fair to 
conclude that Krueger and Overgaard are right to complain 
that, strictly  eaking, we never have direct perceptual ac-
cess to them. 
Defenders of co-presence could avoid this perplexing 
conclusion, of course, by claiming that gestures and behav-
iors are proper parts of mental states. But this implies com-
bining the co-presence thesis with the constitution thesis 
proposed by Krueger and Overgaard. Although Smith says 
nothing about it, it is worth noting that, in principle, there 
is no incompatibility between these two theses. Nothing in 
the co-presence thesis prevents us from thinking that the 
presented aspects of mental states of other people —their 
behavioral manifestations— could be constitutive parts of 
those mental states. In fact, claiming that gestures and be-
haviors can be proper parts of mental states allows us to 
keep a tighter analogy with the way in which, according to 
Husserlian philosophers, we perceive physical things. Af-
ter all, when we perceive a tomato, the presented aspect 
—its front— and its co-presented aspects —its back and 
its innards— are all proper parts of the fruit. Likewise, one 
could consider manifest behaviors and gestures to be the 
presented proper parts of a larger whole: the mental state 
that they express. 
What we would like to suggest, then, is that the weak-
ness of the co-presence thesis resides not in how it explains 
what it means to have a perceptual experience, but in the 
ontological assumption that mental states are something 
entirely different from the gestures and bodily behaviors 
that express them. Thus, we believe that by integrating the 
hybrid model with the co-presence thesis we can obtain a 
better version of the latter, one that is more consistent with 
DSP than Smith’s original proposal. But let us develop this 
idea a little more.   
On the one hand, according to the hybrid model, ges-
tures and behaviors express mental states because they are a 
constitutive part of them. On the other hand, the co-presence 
thesis claims that direct perceptual presentation of others’ be-
havior is accompanied by other a ects of their mental states 
which are anticipated by means of  “if… then…” structures. 
By combining both theses, it can be claimed that the present-
ed (and the co-presented) a ects of others’ mental states are 
constitutively linked to the whole mental state. And it is pre-
cisely in virtue of that constitutive link that when perceiving 
an a ect of the mental life of another person (the behavioral 
a ect), we perceive a part of her mental state.  
Even more, according to Smith’s version of the co-pres-
ence thesis, whilst the gestures and behaviors of others can 
be visually presented to us, their mental states —their an-
ger, their surprise, etc. – are merely co-presented. But now, 
in virtue of the sugge ed combination of the co-presence 
thesis with the constitutive thesis, we should substantially 
revise such a claim. When we are looking at someone’s typ-
ical anger behavior, her anger is not merely co-presented to 
us. Rather, a part of her anger —the agent’s behavior— is 
already presented to us, while another part remains co-pre-
sented. Thus, if we accept this combination of the co-pres-
ence thesis and the hybrid model, Krueger and Overgaard’s 
original argument against Smith loses its force, as they can 
no longer claim that the mental state of another person is 
never presented to us in perception. The reason is straight-
forward: since expressive behaviors are proper parts of the 
mental states in question, when those behaviors are visually 
presented to us, the corresponding mental state is at least 
partially presented to us as well. Moreover, as has been re-
peatedly pointed out, what is co-presented to us when see-
ing an angry person’s current gestures and behavior, what 
we anticipate, are other potential gestures and behaviors 
which, if they actually took place, would be proper parts of 
her mental state of anger. But, of course, if these potential 
behaviors actually occurred, they would become perceptu-
ally presented to us. Therefore, if this happened, the men-
tal state constitutively linked to them would not be merely 
co-presented, but also (partially) presented in them. 
To be clearer, our suggestion consists of combining a the-
sis about what perceiving the mental states of others consists 
in (the co-presence thesis) and an ontological thesis about 
the nature of those mental states of an agent that can be di-
rectly perceived by others (the hybrid model). Of course, the 
co-presence thesis, such as Smith elaborates it, presupposes 
an ontology of mental states that is quite different from the 
one that is held by Krueger and Overgaard. Smith seems to 
be committed to two different claims about the nature of 
mental states. On the one hand, he explicitly endorses a func-
tionalist conception of mental states. On the other hand, he 
seems to accept the idea that mental states are internal and in 
some sense hidden from view (see Smith, 2010, p. 739). Now, it 
should be highlighted that even if many philosophers find it 
natural to combine their functionalist leanings with the claim 
that mental states are private, unobservable, and entirely con-
stituted by internal properties, the former claim is, strictly 
 eaking, independent of the latter. And it is only the claim 
about minds being internal and unobservable that should be 
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abandoned in order to adopt the kind of hybrid view that we 
are presenting here.16 
Our proposal concerning the compatibility of these two 
per ectives relies on the possibility of combining Smith’s the-
ory of how we can perceive the mental states of others and 
Krueger and Overgaard’s thesis about the ontology of those 
perceived mental states. The co-presence thesis provides a 
promising model to understand what perceiving others’ mental 
states can be, but fails to complement this with an appropriate 
conception of what mental states are. In contrast, the hybrid 
model provides a suitable conception of mental states (at least 
if one is intere ed in holding DSP), but fails to complement 
this with an adequate theory of perception. The solution to 
these shortcomings that we are offering here consists of retain-
ing what we consider to be the best part of each model and dis-
missing the elements that, although present in them, constitute 
an impediment to elaborate a more coherent version of DSP. 
Now, it may be argued that, even if the sugge ed inte-
gration of the co-presence and the constitutive theses were 
accomplished, mental states would still end up being “phe-
nomenally degraded”, since there may be some other a ects 
of another’s anger —like its subjective dimension or the way it 
feels to be angry for that person— which would never become 
visually presented to us. However, the present proposal is pre-
pared to explicitly acknowledge this point because the idea is 
not that we can perceive every a ect of the mental states of 
others. Something analogous happens, anyway, with the per-
ception of ordinary objects. Just as we cannot perceive every 
a ect of a fruit that is ripe (we cannot perceive its atomic 
particles, for example),17 we are also not able to perceive the 
subjective dimension of others’ mental states. Notwithstand-
ing, it is still true that, if DSP is correct, we can perceive the 
mental states of others. Just as we can see that a fruit is ripe 
—although we cannot see every a ect of it— we can see that 
another person is angry —although we cannot see the subjec-
tive, or the neurophysiologic, dimension of her anger.  
One last thing to note is that we are drawing the anal-
ogy between perceiving mental states and perceiving ordi-
nary objects in a slightly different —and, to our mind, more 
accurate— way than the one Smith offers. To see this, let us 
return to the case of seeing a tomato. When we see a toma-
to, its front is presented to us while its back remains co-pre-
sented. Smith claims, analogously, that when we see that 
someone is angry, her behavior is the presented a ect, while 
the mental property —the anger itself— remains co-pre-
sented. But there are two additional points that can be 
made about the experience of seeing a tomato that Smith’s 
analogy does not sufficiently take into account. First, what 
we experience is the tomato as a whole. Secondly, there are 
a ects or properties of the tomato (like its molecular prop-
erties) that are not perceived at all. Our proposal allows us 
to include these further a ects by saying that when we see 
someone’s anger, we are presented with a part of it —certain 
behaviors— while other parts of it —a range of potential be-
haviors— remain co-presented. But, at the same time, what 
we are experiencing is the larger whole —the mental state of 
anger— of which the co-presented a ects are part. And of 
course, there are other a ects of this larger whole, such as 
its neurological or subjective properties, which are not part 
of our perceptual experience at all. 
Let us turn now to the objection to Krueger and Over-
gaard’s hybrid model that we presented above. According to it, 
to posit a constitutive relation between behaviors and mental 
states is not sufficient to explain how we are able to perceive 
those mental states as such merely by perceiving their behav-
ioral manife ations. Now, this problem can also be solved 
by combining the hybrid model with the co-presence thesis. 
Consider the case of a person who frowns. What the defender 
of co-presence could now tell us is that in order to perceive 
that gesture as an expression of pain, it is necessary to take into 
account other a ects of that mental state, which, though not 
presented, are co-presented. We see the frown as a gesture 
16 Stricto sensu, functionalists are committed to the idea that what makes something a particular mental state is the way it functions, or 
the role it plays, in the larger system of which it is part (Levin, 2013; Wheeler, 2010). A traditional way of understanding the functionalist 
proposal may add to this that these mental states should be understood, metaphysically speaking, as internal entities that —at least 
in the case of human beings— are identical to or supervene on their owners’ brains. In consonance, this kind of view will take the links 
between these internal mental states and external behavior to be merely causal. Now, this view can be contested. Thus, for example, the 
so called “liberal” or “extended” functionalist claim that mental states may extend beyond the body, coming to include different items 
in the creature’s environment (Wheeler, 2010; Clark, 2008). The core functionalist idea that mental states have a constitutive, distinctive 
cognitive role or function is still part of this picture. But, now, the mental states that have this distinctive functional role can be realized 
in complex and heterogeneous material substrata —that may include internal states of the nervous systems, bodily states, processes and 
responses, and different entities in the external environment. Thus, mental states are better characterized as complex wholes constitut-
ed by these different components and their interactions. Analogously, it seems to us that it is possible to adopt a similar view, according 
to which at least some mental states extend beyond the brain, including the body and its behaviors (even though they may not include 
other items in the creature’s environment). Advocates of such an embodied view should not understand mental states as purely internal 
(neural) items that interact in a merely causal way with gestures and behaviors. Rather, they might be thought as complex cognitive 
states composed of both certain internal states and some gestures and behaviors. And, even though, admittedly, theses different parts 
will interact causally in many ways —as many components of complex systems do—, these causal relations should be thought as rela-
tions amongst parts of these mental states. Consequently, both the causal relations between internal states and behavior and the relata 
in question will be constitutive components of these mental states. It seems to us that this kind of functionalism is perfectly compatible 
with the hybrid view that we are trying to defend here.
17 At least we do not see them in the sense that is relevant to the present debate: that of being able to perceptually experience them 
as atomic particles.
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of pain because we can anticipate further behavior associat-
ed with it. That is what distinguishes perceiving the mental 
state of another person from merely perceiving her current 
behavior. In the first case, the perceiver locates the perceived 
behavior within a broader rational pattern of potential behav-
iors, and this is what allows her to perceive those behaviors as 
part of a larger whole: the mental state of the agent.18 If, on 
the contrary, a subject is capable of perceiving another agent’s 
behavior but is incapable of making the appropriate anticipa-
tions of relevant future behavioral patterns of the agent, she 
will not be able to perceive that behavior as an expression (or 
as a part of) the agent’s mental state. Thus, if we are willing 
to combine the co-presence thesis with the hybrid model, we 
will be in a position to solve the difficulties that, as we argued 
in the previous section, undermine the latter. 
To sum up, we believe that the best alternative for the 
defender of DSP is to combine an ontological thesis, which 
posits a constitutive link between actual behavior and other 
a ects of the mental phenomenon, and an epistemic thesis 
—that of co-presence— which plausibly explains how per-
ception directly provides knowledge of the mental states of 
others as such.    
Final remarks
In this article we have tried to answer the question: 
which would be the best theoretical alternative for those in-
tere ed in defending the thesis according to which we can 
directly perceive some mental states of other people? Taking 
into account two recent proposals —the co-presence and the 
constitution theses—, we have shown how their re ective 
weaknesses can be overcome by combining both of them in 
a complementary way. The correct articulation of those pro-
posals gives us, we think, a better way of understanding what 
direct perception of other minds could consist in.
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